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Marc Schuilenburg
The Dislocating
Perspective of
Assemblages
Another Look at
the Issue of Security
Marc Schuilenburg 
addresses the issue
of governance as
an essential aspect
of the philosophy
of social engineer-
ing. Via the insights
and concepts of 
Foucault and
Deleuze he goes in 
search of a more 
adequate under-
standing of the 
link between social 
reality and govern-
ance. Discussion 
on this should no 
longer be ﬁxated 
on the dichotomy 
between private 
and public, says 
Schuilenburg. 
Society, after all, is 
not an immutable, 
static quantity; it 
has a ﬂuid char-
acter that requires 
thinking in terms 
of surveillance
‘assemblages’.
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During a visit to Canada in April 2008, 
American Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff announced to his 
audience that ﬁngerprints are not part 
of a person’s personal data: ‘A ﬁnger-
print is hardly personal data because
you leave it on glasses and silverware 
and articles all over the world; they’re 
like footprints. They’re not particularly 
private.’1 A reaction was not long in 
coming. It came 
from Canada’s pri-
vacy commissioner,
Jennifer Stoddart. ‘Fingerprints consti-
tute extremely personal information for 
which there is clearly a high expectation 
of privacy.’ 
The debate about where the private
begins and the public ends has a long 
history. It goes back to the French Revo-
lution. The end of the Ancien Régime,
symbolized by the beheading of Louis 
xvi in 1793, ensured that the sover-
eignty of the monarch made way for
the will of the people. No one had the 
exclusive right to rule in their own name
any longer. Two spheres were created to
express what was understood by ‘life’.
In the private domain, the state was to 
leave the individual in peace. Beyond 
the threshold of the home, everyone was 
free to espouse his or her own desires 
and opinions. In the public domain –
the agoras of the cities – however, the 
individual was a citizen who was to set
aside his desires and opinions for the
common good.
The separation between public and
private worked quite nicely for a couple 
of centuries. Now, however, it seems
its best days are over. Municipal inter-
vention teams, made up of inspectors
from social services, energy suppliers,
representatives of housing corpora-
tions and other organizations, show up
unannounced at the homes of residents
with problems. This campaign is called 
‘beyond the front door’. Various tech-
nologies (security cameras, data mining, 
rﬁd chips in clothing, dna tests) are 
employed to increase the perception
of security in the broadest sense of the 
word. ‘Police-like’ responsibilities, such
as the security of semi-public areas like
shopping centres, airports and residen-
tial areas, are increasingly being carried 
out by commercial actors. These prac-
tices and measures seem very diverse, 
yet they have a lot in common. They are 
all employed in the same processes of 
the prevention of perceived risks. Sadly,
debate on this new method of govern-
ance has been hijacked by the catch-all
word ‘privacy’. When we look at the
changes in the issue of security without 
bias, however, we see a more fundamen-
tal problem emerge. In all sorts of areas, 
there is a certain overlap between public
and private practices. These overlaps or
convergences are never stable or static.
They are not sharply demarcated and
they are constantly changing: in form,
in reach, in composition. In order to 
uncover the ‘ground’ of this mobility or
ﬂuidity, we need a different ontologi-
cal and epistemological premise than
the private/public dichotomy outlined
above, upon which modern society is
supposedly based.
In this article I intend to approach 
the ﬂuid character of social reality from
two directions. In the ﬁrst place I want
to make a contribution to the explica-
tion of the relationship between gov-
1. http://thinkprogress.
org/2008/04/16/chertoff-
ﬁngerprints (consulted on 
7 June 2008).
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ernance and social reality. Relying on
Michel Foucault’s analyses of power I 
shall ﬁrst attempt to go one step further 
into his conceptual world. His analyses 
of disciplinarian practices in which the 
individual is shaped by all manner of 
power operations are my starting point.
Via the work of Gilles Deleuze, and in
particular his concept of ‘assemblage’, 
I wish to give greater depth to the link
between the social and governance. By
relating this concept to security regimes 
in our immediate environment, I shall 
show that this mobility should not be
confused with ‘chaos’ or a ‘new dis-
order’.2 And this leads directly to the
second objective of 
this article. When
we approach the
social based on the 
concept of assemblage, we see count-
less hybrid connections emerge, which
enter into unexpected relationships with
one another. Which relationships are we 
then talking about? How do these attain 
a certain consistency or coherence? 
Through these questions I ultimately 
aim to outline a number of rough
characteristics of how the issue of gov-
ernance has come to circle ever closer 
around social reality. 
Discipline and Biopolitics
Foucault deﬁned the eighteenth century
as a disciplinarian society, in which
power was exercised in a way different
from the sovereign society that had pre-
ceded it. In the sovereign society, abso-
lute power rested with the monarch. A 
violation of the law was interpreted as 
an assault on his body. With the shift 
from a sovereign state to a disciplinar-
ian society, oppression, negativity and 
a vertical structure, hallmarks of what
Foucault calls sovereign power, are
replaced by anonymous and horizontal
power relationships. These branch out 
as a network and penetrate the entire
societal domain. The consequence
is that the exercise of power can no 
longer be attributed to a person (‘the 
monarch’) or to a rule (‘the law’). With 
his assertion that power is never exclu-
sively vested in ‘things’ or in ‘persons’, 
that we must hence learn to think of 
it in terms of prohibition and oppres-
sion, Foucault wants to make clear that
power, in and of itself, is nothing. It
has no essence, Deleuze emphasizes in
his monograph about Foucault’s work. 
Power is purely a relationship between
forces, which essentially means that it
has not been formalized.3 It is only pro-
duced in the rela-
tionships between 
different points. In 
this way, power relationships (virtual, 
unstable, unlocalizable and molecular) 
deﬁne the possibilities or probabilities 
of the actual interactions in social real-
ity. The actualization of these differ-
ential relationships, Foucault shows in 
Discipline and Punish (1975), unfolds
in the institutions of the disciplinarian 
society, in its schools, prisons, factories, 
hospitals, army barracks. This actuali-
zation is not a unilateral process, but 
rather the result of a whole series of 
mutually reinforcing effects whereby 
each separate institution integrates the 
power relationships of the diagram 
of the social domain in its own way 
and in its own environment (alloca-
2. See for instance René 
Boomkens, De nieuwe 
wanorde. Globalisering en 
het einde van de maakbare 
samenleving (Amsterdam: 
Van Gennep, 2006).
3. Gilles Deleuze, Foucault
(Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1988),
37.
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tion, classiﬁcation, consolidation, 
normalization, etcetera).
Unlike in the sovereign society, the
realization that the individual can be 
socially engineered emerges. Building on
the humanist insights of the Enlighten-
ment, various techniques are applied in
the separate institutions to teach socially
desirable behaviour. The consequences
of this are most visible in the army. In 
the seventeenth century, the soldier is
still described as someone one recog-
nizes by his courage or ﬁghting spirit.
This changes, however, in the eighteenth 
century. From a meaningful body that 
radiates energy and honour, the body 
of the soldier is reduced to a cog in the 
machine. The soldier is shaped by exer-
cises in which he learns to hold his head 
high and his back straight and to move 
in a uniform manner. Through correc-
tive exercises, which are aimed at gen-
erating speciﬁc and measurable effects,
the soldier is furnished with a coherent 
identity. This disciplining of the body 
does not take place only in army camps.
Discipline-oriented techniques are also 
applied in other societal institutions: the 
prison, the hospital, the school and the
workplace. And simply because its disci-
plinarian effect is equivalent to those of 
a series of other institutions with which 
the individual is confronted through-
out his life, the army can be compared 
to the factory, which in turn has eve-
rything in common with a prison.
Without interruption, the individual in 
fact moves from one institution to the
other: from the family to the school, 
from the school to the factory, and so 
forth. We are dealing with a continuous
progression in a sequence of separate
spaces through which the institutions 
continually refer to one another. At 
school you are told you are no longer at 
home. At work you
hear ‘you’re not at 
school anymore’.4
The picture of society that is pre-
sented here is a succession of separate
spaces, whereby the individual moves 
from point to point as though there 
were constantly something new to be 
added to his life. To emphasize this 
transformation, Deleuze and Guattari 
speak of moving in a segmented or stri-
ated space.5 With this they indicate that 
space in a discipli-
narian society was 
above all an ori-
ented space, that is 
to say an expression
of a progressive perception of time in 
which the individual constituted himself 
as a subject and emancipated himself 
with an eye towards a ﬁnal state to be 
attained. In reading Discipline and Pun-
ish, however, one is immediately struck 
by the fact that nowhere in it does 
Foucault address the question of which 
power relationship acts on the bodies 
in the spaces ‘between’ the institutions 
of modernity. In other words, what 
forms or categories of power continue 
to operate in the open space of cities? 
For this we must go back to two texts
by Foucault from the ﬁrst half of the 
1970s. In them he takes a cautious step 
towards an explanation in which the 
public space increasingly becomes the 
domain of an effort towards regula-
tion or control of life. In these texts he 
refers to biopolitics, a form of power
that emerges in the second half of the 
4. Gilles Deleuze, Nego-
tiations 1972-1990 (New 
York: Columbia University
Press, 1995), 177.
5. Gilles Deleuze and Félix
Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (Min-
neapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987),
474-500.
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eighteenth century and regulates social
life from the inside out. With the con-
cept of biopower he derives from this, 
Foucault has a different type of power 
operation in mind than disciplinarian 
power. Whereas discipline is directed at
the individual body, biopower concen-
trates on the populations. The object of 
political strategies is not the social engi-
neering of the individual body, but the
body as a type. The term ‘biopolitics’, 
which would be addressed in greater
detail in The Will to Knowledge (1976), 
ﬁrst appears in the lecture ‘La naissance 
de la médecine sociale’ which Foucault
delivered at the State University of Rio
de Janeiro in October 1974. ‘For capi-
talist society, it was bio-politics, the bio-
logical, the somatic, the corporal, that
mattered more than anything else. The 
body is a bio-political reality; medicine
is a bio-political strategy.’6 Through 
population control 
biopolitics has a
direct relationship 
with bare life itself.
The population is no longer an abstract 
quantity, nor does it coincide with the
number of inhabitants in relation to a 
habitable territory. On the contrary, it 
manifests itself, in Foucault’s words, 
‘as an object of surveillance, analy-
sis, intervention,
modiﬁcations, and
so on’.7
In the process, the conditions under 
which people live and the way their 
bodies function as the bearers of bio-
logical processes (public health, births 
and deaths, average lifespan, popula-
tion growth, education) become part
of the ‘governance’ of society. Foucault 
expresses this method of governance 
with the neologism gouvernementalité.
In it the ratio is not predicated on the
‘control’ of the population of which
Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532) was 
exemplary, but on the ‘management’ of 
relations among people. That is to say, 
the objective is the optimization of all
those aspects of life that promote the 
welfare of the population as a whole. 
Everything is Private and Everything
is Public
In the article ‘Post-scriptum sur les 
sociétés de controle’, Gilles Deleuze 
uses the image of an open space to 
analyse how another diagram is slowly 
replacing the effects of the disciplinar-
ian society. He argues that we are at a 
point where the disciplinarian society is
slowly shifting towards a control soci-
ety, a term Deleuze borrows from Wil-
liam Burroughs, author of the famous 
novels Junkie and Naked Lunch.8 In 
a 1972 interview 
with Penthouse, 
Burroughs alludes 
to this new mecha-
nism of power: 
‘The point is that the means of con-
trol are much more efﬁcient now. We 
have computers . . . So the possibilities 
for control are much more powerful 
than they’ve ever been.’ And in 1959’s 
Naked Lunch he writes, ‘The logical
extension of encephalographic research 
is biocontrol; that is control of physi-
cal movement, mental processes, emo-
tional reactions and apparent sensory 
impressions by means of bioelectric 
signals injected into the nervous system 
6. Michel Foucault, ‘La
naissance de la médecine
sociale’, in: Dits et écrits, 
1954–1988 (Paris: Galli-
mard, 1994), 207-228.
7. Michel Foucault, ‘La
politique de la santé au 
XVIIIe siècle’, in: ibid., 18.
8. Deleuze, Negotiations, 
op. cit. (note 4), 177-182;
Gilles Deleuze, Two 
Regimes of Madness. Texts 
and Interviews 1975-1995
(Los Angeles/New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2004), 321.
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of the subject.’9
In an extension
to this, Deleuze
observes that the closed structures of 
the disciplinarian society are gradually 
losing their hold. The institutions of 
the disciplinarian society have passed
their sell-by date. The walls of schools, 
barracks, factories and prisons are 
tumbling down. There is a general-
ized crisis in the domain of every form
of conﬁnement. The consequences of 
these changes are visible everywhere.
Through electronic surveillance, 
whereby the inmate serves out his sen-
tence outside the walls of his cell, the
prison has expanded to the immediate 
surroundings of the inmate’s home.
Through home care, another institution, 
the hospital, is transposing its activi-
ties to the habitat of the patient. Even 
the transition from school to work has 
become diffuse. At work people are 
constantly expected to continue to learn
through various trainings and courses. 
At the same time, the laptop is taken 
home so that people can keep working 
over the weekend. The signiﬁcance of 
these transitions lies in the perspec-
tive they provide on the relationship
between governance and the social 
order. Simply formulated, control is not 
discipline. Or, as Deleuze remarked in
an earlier article: ‘You don’t conﬁne 
people with a highway. But by making 
highways, you multiply the means of 
control. I am not saying this is the only 
aim of highways, but people can travel 
inﬁnitely and “freely” without being
conﬁned while 
being perfectly
controlled.’10
Deleuze’s argument that control deﬁnes
the relationships of the social sphere 
leads to the objection that it is insuf-
ﬁciently clear in what way this form of 
power genuinely differs from the two
eighteenth-century poles of discipline
and biopower. Aside from the fact that 
control also played a fundamental role
in the sovereign and disciplinarian soci-
eties, the examples in ‘Post-scriptum sur 
les sociétés de controle’ do not provide a
picture different from that of Foucault’s 
disciplinarian analyses of power. We are 
still dealing with techniques that turn 
individual bodies into productive, efﬁ-
cient and obedient labourers. All things 
considered, nowadays the method used 
on motorways to indicate that a driver 
has committed a violation (‘You are 
driving too fast’, ‘Maintain sufﬁcient 
distance’) has no other purpose than
the immediate correction of the driving 
behaviour. Yet Deleuze undeniably has a 
point when he links spatial transforma-
tions with changes in social reality itself.
Whether we deﬁne this development in 
terms of ‘risk’ (Ulrich Beck in Risk Soci-
ety, 1992), ‘security’ (David Garland in
The Culture of Control, 2001) or ‘ict’ 
(Manuel Castells in his network trilogy 
The Information Age, 1996), it is clear 
that the term ‘environment’ has become 
a very broad concept in our present 
society. In particular, Deleuze shows
that the striated space of the disciplinar-
ian society is making way for a smooth 
or open space. Whereas the disciplinar-
ians techniques operated in closed and 
ﬁxed spaces (walls, borders, gates), each
with its speciﬁc function, the control
society operates through constantly 
changing networks or open spaces.
9. William Burroughs,
Naked Lunch (New York: 
Grove Press Inc., 1959),
162.
10. Deleuze, Two Regimes
of Madness, op. cit. (note 
8), 322.
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Mobility, ﬂexibility and acceleration are
the new qualities of these environments. 
An open space is no simple concept. 
The word ‘open’ can give rise to all 
sorts of misunderstandings, misunder-
standings related to form, trajectory 
and unity. An open space differs from a 
striated space in three particulars. In the 
ﬁrst place in its form: the surface of a
striated space is delimited and enclosed;
special spaces are assigned to catego-
ries of persons (school pupils, patients,
prisoners). An open space has no deﬁ-
nite boundaries or a privileged form. It 
can be extended in any direction and is
conﬁned only by a horizon that shifts
as the audience moves. For this reason, 
we can no longer speak of an absolute 
‘inside’ or ‘outside’. Even concepts like
‘distance’ or ‘opposite’ lose their classi-
cal meanings here. In the second place, 
the relationship between point and line 
is inverted. In a striated space a line lies
between two separate points. As we
have seen, each of these points (school,
factory, hospital) has its own customs.
In an open space the point lies between 
two lines, which implies that the sepa-
rate points are subordinate to the tra-
jectory that continues on a horizontal
plane or ﬁeld. An open space stimulates
and orders separate dimensions without 
turning them into a totalizing whole. 
There is only a continual variation of 
form and size. In the third place, the
nature of the line differs. Whereas in 
a striated space dimensional lines and
closed intervals can be distinguished, 
in an open space we are dealing with
directional lines and open intervals. 
An open space realizes itself in what it
causes to disappear. That does not make 
it a homogeneous or undivided space, as 
though there were no segments or rup-
tures within it. Multiple spaces can be 
present in an open space, just as multi-
ple languages exist in one language. We
should only understand that the rup-
tures between the spaces are no longer 
absolute, as they are in a striated space 
in which one must pass through all sorts 
of physical barriers (gates, booms) in 
order to enter. An open space, in and
of itself, always has multiple meanings. 
Or to put it another way, you can be 
private in a public space and public in a 
private.
‘It’s a Mall World’
An open space is a continuum or surface 
network of different dimensions with
their own details, speeds and effects. 
To enter into an open space means to 
enter into local and unstable environ-
ments, environments that are constantly 
changing in reach and size, in sound 
and colour, in mood and intensity. If we 
take this odd mixture, which is becom-
ing the domain of a stronger and also 
more direct governance apparatus with 
health and security as its most important 
parameters, as a representation of social 
reality, we see, in the words of Deleuze, 
a ‘very strange world’ unfold. In an 
allusion to Leibniz, he speaks of a Har-
lequin suit or a patchwork quilt.11 The 
latter is a peculiar fabric, full of colours, 
contrasts and asymmetrical shapes, in
which countless bits 
of cloth are held 
together by a tangle
of loose threads. Its 
multiplicity is dif-
11. Deleuze and Guattari,
A Thousand Plateaus, 
op. cit. (note 5), 476-477;
Gilles Deleuze and Claire
Parnet, Dialogen
(Kampen: Kok Agora, 
1991), 90.
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ﬁcult to apprehend and deﬁne from one
exclusive angle, as is usual in the social 
sciences, where abstract quantities deﬁne
inextricable entities that exist by the pre-
sumption of a common order. Just think 
of container concepts like ‘risk society’, 
‘culture of control’, ‘insurance state’,
‘post-disciplinarian society’, ‘security 
society’, ‘exclusion society’, ‘prevention 
culture’, ‘spectacle society’, and so on.
This kind of thinking is still trapped in
a representational logic that does not 
acknowledge social reality as such. For 
this reason, it cannot be sufﬁciently 
emphasized, says Deleuze, that a society
is constantly escaping in all directions,
never stops slipping away and, he asserts 
in an interview, is ﬂowing everywhere.12
From this standpoint, the main empha-
sis is no longer on abstract quantities, 
but on the ﬂuid character of social 
reality itself.
What does this
mean in terms of 
governance? Or expressed another way,
in what way do all manner of ‘hybrids’, 
to use one of Bruno Latour’s terms,
emerge in our environment, whose
objective is the prevention of potential 
risks? If we look at recent writings on
the imbedding of the issue of security,
we ﬁnd discussions of ‘surveillance 
assemblages’.13 This term expresses the
fact that surveil-
lance is driven by 
an uncontrolla-
ble need to bring
together actors, 
practices, technolo-
gies and informa-
tion systems and 
to integrate them 
into larger entities. These can be insur-
ance companies, national security, mul-
tinationals, social security, shopping 
centres, and so on. All these separate 
practices have a distinct style of opera-
tion, use their own information systems, 
apply speciﬁc deﬁnitions of normal-
ity and deviating truths, and all these 
characteristics are aimed at making a 
speciﬁc public (or to put it a better way, 
‘publics’) visible. It would therefore be 
inaccurate to identify this public with
an individual or a population.14 Each
medium creates its 
own users. This is 
about the ‘public 
of an insurance 
plan’, the ‘public of
a shopping centre’,
the ‘public of a policy measure’. Because
of the growing inﬂuence of information
and communication technologies on
contemporary society and the organiza-
tion of the urban space in particular,
this new entity does not manifest itself 
in a demarcated space (‘school’ or 
‘national state’), but rather actualizes 
itself in an open environment in which
people encounter one another differ-
ently and are monitored in a different 
way. To put it a better way, surveillance 
is incorporated into the movement of a 
public through an open space.
Take the example of a Sunday
football match. At 1:29 p.m. I close 
my front door behind me. The lady
who lives across the street looks at me
inquisitively. To increase local security 
she’s signed up with Burgernet (‘Citizen
Net’), a police initiative to enrol citi-
zens in the investigation of crimes. The 
police left a message on her answering 
12. Deleuze, Two Regimes
of Madness, op. cit. (note
8), 280.
13. K.D. Haggerty and 
R.V. Ericson, ‘The surveil-
lant assemblage’, British
Journal of Sociology
(2000), 51, 4, 605-622;
Ed Romein and Marc
Schuilenburg, ‘Are you on
the fast track? The rise of 
surveillant assemblages 
in a post industrial age’,
Architectural Theory
Review (2008), 13, 2, 
forthcoming.
14. See also Mauricio
Lazzarato, ‘Life and the
Living in the Societies of 
Control’, in: M. Fugslang
and M. Sørensen (eds.),
Deleuze and the Social
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2006),
171-190.
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machine yesterday with the description
of a man who has broken into several 
cars in the area. If my neighbour notices 
anything she can call a direct number, 
whereupon the dispatcher sends the
nearest police ofﬁcers to the location.
On the way to the neighbourhood shop
to quickly buy a pack of gum, I am 
watched by a network of intelligent 
cameras that link my face to a database 
of photos of recidivists, comparing me 
to millions of people in 60 seconds. It
is now 1:35 p.m. The neighbourhood 
shop, in turn, is part of the Collectieve 
Winkelontzegging (‘Collective Shop 
Ban’) project. This is an initiative of 
shop owners and shop-owners’ associa-
tions to combat trouble on their own.
If someone behaves inappropriately 
in the shop, be it shoplifting, or being 
rude to the staff, this person can be 
banned. This ban applies not just to 
the neighbourhood shop, but to all the 
other shops in the city centre. By now it
is 1:41 p.m. With a pack of Sportlife in 
my pocket I press my public transport 
chip card against the scanner of the 
turnstile at the metro station at 1:47 
p.m. ‘Easy, fast and secure’ – these are 
the marketing terms printed on the chip
card. Thanks to a unique identiﬁcation
code, all my travel details are recorded 
in a central database. This provides a
complete picture of the distances I travel 
by metro, bus, tram and train. When I 
arrive at the stadium I show my season 
ticket to the stewards who are responsi-
ble for order and security in the stands. 
It is now 1:56 p.m.
In less than half an hour, from my
front door to the football stadium, I 
have passed ﬁve difference surveillance 
assemblages. At ﬁrst glance we move 
autonomously and without friction 
through the same open space. Yet while 
this environment gives the suggestion 
of being continuous, it is actually popu-
lated by so many different assemblages 
that any openness or smoothness is 
merely illusion. Most of the time the 
unique interplay of concealments and 
revelations remains invisible to the mov-
ing public. This changes only when the 
public transport chip card is blocked, 
facial markers match details in the 
shop-owners’ association register, or the 
stadium stewards have been notiﬁed of 
the rather turbulent football history of 
a particular person. While each ‘island’ 
has its own values, its own logic and 
principles, we should not imagine that 
these assemblages have nothing to do 
with one another. These environments 
can just as easily ignore or exclude one 
another – sometimes they even turn 
against one another, but more often they 
reinforce one another, overlap or con-
verge into new assemblages. I have con-
ﬁned myself to a few examples. Private 
institutions are getting more and more 
access to information from government 
departments, and vice versa. Organiza-
tions and institutions such as internal 
revenue departments, police, social serv-
ices, supermarkets and hospitals also 
exchange information in order to chart 
life. In addition, government person-
nel are increasingly working for private 
parties. The largest shopping centre in 
Europe, the MetroCentre in Gateshead, 
England (‘If we don’t have it, you don’t 
want it’), is equipped with the latest 
surveillance electronics, but that has not 
kept its management from increasing 
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security within its walls by hiring police 
ofﬁcers from the Northumbria Police.
Not only does the police still enjoy 
great symbolic power and authority,
but this also gives the shopping centre’s 
security personnel access to the infor-
mation sources and
intelligence (crime-
related data) of the 
police force.15
In short, infor-
mation travels 
back and forth between practices
over all sorts of complex networks; 
in one assemblage citizens turn out to 
be policemen, in another assemblage
policemen are in the employ of private 
security ﬁrms. Unfortunately, research
into the splintering of security measures 
usually focus on one environment, for 
example Burgernet, camera surveil-
lance or private security. Research that
is not limited to a single environment,
but rather outlines how separate ele-
ments affect different practices, is
scarcely undertaken. As a result, too 
little attention is paid to the fact that 
a surveillance is never a starting point 
or an end point, but always a middle, 
literally a medium in which elements
from all sorts of heterogeneous practices
interconnect. Instead of seeing in these 
assemblages a simple curtailment of the 
freedom of movement or an invasion 
of privacy, we must try to understand 
its ontological and epistemological
premise. For one element of an assem-
blage can break away, to a relative 
extent, and go on to function in another 
assemblage. It can be taken out of one
assemblage, concludes Manuel DeLanda 
in A New Philosophy of Society, and 
be incorporated in
another context.16
In turn, this context
is formed by new
variables, unforeseen interactions and 
other outcomes. Order and unity are 
not provided a priori; they form at a
secondary level, from the relationships
within the assemblages. This still does 
not answer the question of the consist-
ency of an assemblage. In other words, 
in what way are heterogeneous elements 
kept together in a surveillance assem-
blage? Is there a speciﬁc ‘causality’, and 
if so, how can we explain it?
Content and Expression
The ‘assemblage’ concept is central to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ambitious work 
A Thousand Plateaus, the second part 
of Capitalism & Schizophrenia. The
French word for assemblage (agence-
ment) expresses the heterogeneous 
and mobile nature of social reality. 
Agencement is terminologically related 
to the Latin agens, which means ‘to 
guide’ of ‘to set into motion’. This
guiding principle (agens) expresses a 
process of ‘arranging’, ‘organizing’ or
‘connecting’. But the guiding force of 
this process never operates outside an
assemblage. An assemblage has its own
force of action. It is something active. 
This self-organizing activity cannot be
reduced to its elements; it lies instead 
in the relationships between the ele-
ments that make up an assemblage. 
Unlike a closed entity, an assemblage 
operates in an open combination of 
heterogeneous elements.
15. Adam Crawford, ‘Net-
worked Governance and
the Post-Regulatory State?
Steering, Rowing and 
Anchoring the Provision
of Policing and Security’,
Theoretical Criminology
(2006), 10, 4, 449-479.
16. Manuel DeLanda, A 
New Philosophy of Soci-
ety: Assemblage Theory
and Social Complexity
(London: Continuum, 
2006), 10.
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Deleuze and Guattari distinguish two 
dimensions that give an assemblage 
order and cohesion, in other words a
basis from which to operate: the hori-
zontal and the vertical dimension. The
horizontal dimension is formed by the 
relationship between expression and
content. By the content aspect of an 
assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari mean 
the interaction or organization of quali-
ties among objects, bodies and animals 
in a concrete practice. They call these 
practices non-discursive formations.
These can be institutions like a school
or a prison, but also political events 
(the French Revolution, 9/11), eco-
nomic practices (insurance systems) and 
(social) processes (exclusion). By the 
expressive aspect they mean the totality 
of signs that links these formations. This
can include linguistic expressions (sym-
bols, words) and non-linguistic expres-
sions, such as the bodily postures or
clothing of persons. For clothing is more
than simply something to keep the body 
warm. It is also used to express a par-
ticular function (police ofﬁcer, steward),
indicate a social status (a three-piece
suit) or works as a form of self-styling
(football supporter). 
For the foundations of the differ-
ence between the two aspects, they base 
their argument loosely on the work of 
Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev, who in 
Deleuze’s terms, has developed a Spino-
zaesque theory of language in which
content and expression do not rely on
a predominant signiﬁer. Expression, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue in A Thou-
sand Plateaus, does not coincide with
a signiﬁer. At the same time, content is
not the same as the signiﬁed. There is 
no equivalence or analogy – in the sense
of ‘description’ or ‘correspondence’ – 
between the two. Content and expres-
sion function relatively independently
from each other. Relatively, because
they only exist through the relationships
that take place between them. In no
way are content and expression directly 
or absolutely dependent on each other.
In this Deleuze and Guattari reject the
supposed synthesis between content and
expression. Take the statement ‘I swear’. 
This takes on a different meaning when
it is spoken by a pupil to a teacher, by
a minister taking the oath of ofﬁce, 
or by a defendant during a trial. For 
this reason, it is not enough to observe 
that only the setting (school, parlia-
ment, courtroom) changes. That would 
suggest that the statement remains 
essentially the same. Not only do the
elements or ‘the nature’ of the separate 
settings differ, but the statement itself 
takes on a different expression.
A rather fundamental distinction, 
it seems. Yet the attention of the social
sciences turns sporadically to everyday
interactions among people in divergent 
formations. Criminology, for instance,
seems to nurture a structural distrust
of the incidental character of everyday
reality. In order to safeguard the sustain-
ability and homogeneity of the social,
natural forms of expression (sensation, 
gossip, frustration, kick) and so-called 
coincidental elements (the role of women
in organized crime) are seldom inves-
tigated. These are largely kept outside
‘the order of the discourse’, to quote 
Foucault. Criminology prefers to con-
centrate on patterns or expressions that
can be labelled as rational and that are
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the product of abstract quantities such 
as ‘the economy’, ‘the culture’, or ‘the 
criminal organization’. In this it builds 
on a structure of general laws that can
be applied to individual elements. In this
reduction of social reality to a static-
free order, there
is only room for 
linear processes 
and predictable
behaviours.17
According to Deleuze, however,
expression is in no way the logical con-
sequence of content, in the sense that 
without content no expression can exist. 
Or to put it another way, there is no 
causal link between content and expres-
sion. If there are notable similarities,
this is only because these are the con-
sequences of the relationships between 
content and expression in an assem-
blage. Similarities must therefore not 
be seen as the cause of production. This 
confuses process and product, argues
Brian Massumi.18 Content and expres-
sion are independ-
ent processes that
operate separately
from ‘the incident’
or ‘the case’ to which they refer. In this 
Deleuze and Guattari are going quite 
far. Not only do they call content and
expression two ‘non-parallel formaliza-
tions’, but these also have their own
form and substance that are again
entirely heterogeneous, and sometimes 
even multiple forms and substances.19
From this standpoint there is no ﬁnal 
form that still 
ensures a connec-
tion between con-
tent and expression.
Between content and expression there is
only a process that links the two forms.
This process itself has no form. Deleuze
speaks of a zone of indiscernibility, a
play of forces, which he characterizes as
pure intensity.
De- and Re-Territorialization
In addition to the horizontal dimension
there is another aspect to an assem-
blage. Deleuze and Guattari call this
the vertical dimension. Here they are 
reasoning in terms of territory. Every
assemblage is territorial. In that regard,
the discovery of the environment (in
the sense of Umwelt, that which is all 
around us) has been a deﬁning feature
of the past century; just think of Henri
Lefebvre’s studies into everyday urban
space and Ervin Goffman’s into the
inﬂuence of institutions (prisons, con-
vents, boarding schools, psychiatric
institutions) on the individual. In these
studies the main question is no longer
‘who is man?’, but ‘where is man?’ Nat-
urally this can be an identiﬁable loca-
tion, like a football stadium or a part
of the city (neighbourhood, metro). But
a territory is more than simply a ﬁxed
place. A place is also something where
something occurs, where something
takes place, where something is expe-
rienced. In other words the problem of 
contextuality, or as Jeroen Brouwers
writes in his novel Datumloze dagen
(Dateless Days, 2007): ‘just as a gold-
ﬁsh hates the cat and the cat hates the
water.’ What primarily interests Deleuze
and Guattari is how territorialization,
that which deﬁnes the boundaries of a
territory, operates. Take the example
17. See also Patrick Van
Calster, ‘Re-visiting Mr.
Nice. On organized crime 
as conversational interac-
tion’, Crime, Law and 
Social Change (2006), 45, 
4-5, 337-359.
18. Brian Massumi,
A Shock to Thought: 
Expression After Deleuze
and Guattari, (Londen: 
Routledge, 2002), 8.
19. Deleuze and Guattari,
A Thousand Plateaus, op. 
cit. (note 5), 86; Deleuze,
Two Regimes of Madness,
op. cit. (note 8), 242.
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of a gated community. In these areas, 
speciﬁc social arrangements are in force
alongside the laws and rules of jurispru-
dence of the national state. These mark 
the transition to rules and prescriptions 
different from those in the rest of soci-
ety. When a house in a gated community 
is bought, the buyer signs a detailed
contract that sums up the locally appli-
cable rights and rules connected with 
the lifestyle and culture of the commu-
nity in question. These rules can vary
from a ban on drinking alcohol to the 
approved place to hang laundry. The 
contract, in other words, expresses the
locally applicable, communal values and
standards.20 Adam Crawford therefore
speaks of a ‘contractual governance’,
whereby local
agreements function
as instruments of 
social control.21 In 
the shadow of the
law, these contracts
produce their own 
normality or local
jurisprudence.
This brings us to the last aspect of 
the vertical dimension. Perhaps the 
misunderstanding that territorialization 
only curtails the mobility of an assem-
blage has been created. The process of 
territorialization does bring about a
uniﬁcation of a social space, a certain 
cohesion of the place and identity of 
the persons present. But a territory like
a gated community or deprived neigh-
bourhood cannot always maintain its 
form; it does not remain a cohesive 
arrangement of a concrete social ﬁeld 
indeﬁnitely. An assemblage is only con-
ceivable against the backdrop of an inﬁ-
nite mobility of social reality. In order
to thematize this, Deleuze speaks of a 
line of deterritorialization, a movement 
that sets an assemblage adrift. This 
line escapes every assemblage, which 
means that it is constantly breaking 
open the existing ﬁeld of arrangements. 
It dismantles every signifying and every 
formative order by creating new open-
ings and new connections. So an assem-
blage can break down at any moment. 
This movement of continual decomposi-
tion always corrects itself. Deleuze and 
Guattari call this reterritorialization. 
The two movements imply each other. 
The one does not exist without the 
other. Every reterritorialization entails a
deterritorialization. 
So an assemblage consists of four
aspects: in addition to content, expres-
sion and territory, deterritorialization 
is also part of an assemblage. This
last notion needs further explica-
tion. There is always something that
escapes an assemblage. Deleuze calls
this alternately a line of deterritorializa-
tion or a line of ﬂight. In Dialogues he 
describes this line as follows: ‘It liber-
ates a pure matter, it undoes codes, it 
carries expressions, contents, states of 
things and utterances along a zigzag
broken line of ﬂight, it raises time to 
the inﬁnitive, it releases a becoming 
which no longer has any limit, because 
each term is a stop
which must be 
jumped over.’22
More speciﬁcally, a line of ﬂight has 
two characteristics. In the ﬁrst place it 
is abstract. Because the line of ﬂight is 
abstract, it should not be understood in 
terms of content or expression. It goes 
20. Marc Schuilenburg,
‘Citizenship Revisited: 
Denizens and Margizens’, 
Peace Review – A Journal 
of Social Justice (2008),
20, 3, forthcoming.
21. Adam Crawford, 
‘“Contractual govern-
ance” of deviant behav-
ior’, Journal of Law and 
Society (2003), 30, 4, 
479-505.
22. Deleuze and Parnet, 
Dialogen, op. cit. (note 
11), 113.
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much further. It is abstract because it 
ignores not only the difference between 
content and expression, but also the
distinction between form and substance. 
A line of ﬂight is therefore not abstract 
merely because it is immaterial. It is also 
formless. In the second place, a line of 
ﬂight is immanent, which means that 
it is always part of a concrete assem-
blage.23 The line of ﬂight is incorporated 
in the organization
of an assemblage. 
In order to empha-
size the openness of 
an assemblage and the mobility of social 
reality, therefore, there has to be some-
thing that breaks through the order and
cohesion and establishes a connection to
other elements. This does not happen by 
synthesizing or adding elements, but by 
removing them from an assemblage and 
forming a different assemblage by con-
necting them to new elements. This is
how movements of deterritorialization 
form new assemblages. In a dual move-
ment, the territory is continually being
reorganized, and as the principle of a 
deterritorializing movement, no less. For
this reason, Deleuze considers the line
of ﬂight primary; it comes before every-
thing else. A line of ﬂight, after all, has
no territory. Terri-
tories always come 
second.24
Governance and Social Reality
Why is the concept of ‘assemblage’ more
adequate than other terms to character-
ize the relationship between governance 
and social reality? In any event because 
an assemblage makes clear that the 
question of the multiplicity and the vari-
ations of social reality should be given
prominence, in other words ‘the hetero-
geneous’ and ‘the ﬂuidity’ of existence. 
Note: neither concept presents new
abstract principles intended to provide
a new representation of reality. Rather,
they coincide separately with each ‘inci-
dent’ or each ‘case’. This is why we 
cannot take the concept of assemblage, 
which Deleuze also applies to biology
and literature, to the point of individu-
alization and even in the domain of 
warfare, literally enough. It forces us to
think about a different ontological and
epistemological premise from what we
were used to, with binary distinctions
like individual/environment, part/whole,
rational/irrational, and so on. Allow me
to conclude by summarizing the most
signiﬁcant implications of the concep-
tual apparatus introduced here, mind-
ful of Foucault’s wish to approach it as
a toolbox full of devices to have a go
at reality. I shall do this in three varia-
tions, each dealing with the relationship
between governance and social real-
ity. In other words, how do we break 
with the classic understanding of social
engineering, in which the individual is
described in rational and instrumental 
terms and the effects of which keep soci-
ety as a whole in balance?
1. The idea of social engineering is
based on a distance between an individ-
ual and an environment. Without being
part of it, the individual faces his imme-
diate environment. From an external 
position, he can apprehend and com-
prehend social reality in its entirety. As
an answer to its limitations in bringing 
23. Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari, Kafka: 
Toward a Minor Literature
(Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 
1986), 7.
24. Deleuze and Guattari,
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about effective changes in society, gov-
ernance should not be seen as a strategy 
one can deliberately strive for. It is not 
based on a subject-oriented approach. If 
we look, for instance, at the technolo-
gies described (camera, public transport 
card, neighbour) in the surveillance 
assemblages, it would be a mistake to
interpret these as neutral instruments
that can purposefully be employed to
achieve long-term objectives. In reality, 
technologies are never value-free. Tech-
nologies are social before they are tech-
nological. Rather than deﬁning this kind
of element in isolation, we should there-
fore look at their context and its effects.
In other words, a ‘co-functioning’ is
needed to achieve meaning. Otherwise
these technologies remain marginal or 
they are little used. This takes us far 
from a traditional subject philosophy 
(‘I think, therefore I am’) in which the 
actions and decisions of a person are 
the product of a free, autonomous actor 
who always remains equal to himself.
We have to assume that the effects of 
an assemblage cannot be ascribed to an 
individual and are not ascribed to an 
individual. Instead, the point is that the
individual himself is an assemblage, a
ceaseless process of transformation that,
as it were, no longer has a beginning or 
an end.
2. Behind the distinction part/whole 
lurks the hypothesis that parts exist 
because of the whole (‘something that 
already exists’). Not only are they part 
of the whole, they maintain the whole
in existence. Evocative examples include 
the well-known theories that speak 
of ‘society’ (‘risk society’) or ‘culture’ 
(‘prevention culture’). Yet when these 
focus on society as a closed whole, one 
can no longer speak of a strategy that 
extends in all directions and operates 
the same way at all levels of society. If 
the analysis that society is not an immu-
table, static quantity, an undifferenti-
ated social space that has a ﬁxed order, 
is correct, then we must stop studying 
the all-encompassing whole, that is to 
say society as a homogeneous entity 
with an internal cohesion. Instead we 
should look for the countless different 
signifying and formative arrangements 
created by new types of relationships 
and the categories and meanings that 
function as a result. In more general 
terms, we should focus on concrete 
assemblages, keeping in mind that there 
are always lines of ﬂight that establish 
connections with unforeseen elements 
in other assemblages. On that point we 
have already observed that an assem-
blage is never self-contained, but rather 
always refers to other environments 
that operate or are yet to operate, with 
as a result an almost unlimited growth 
of completely different transformation 
matrices and productions of social syn-
theses in social reality. 
3. The dynamic in a social constellation 
has traditionally been described in terms 
of a causal infrastructure. Behind this 
idea we ﬁnd the presumption that the 
actions of individuals are the product of 
the whole (‘society’, ‘culture’, ‘group’) 
these persons are part of. This whole 
precedes the actions of persons, so that 
these actions unfold in an identiﬁable 
and predictable way. Subsequently, the 
explanation for these behaviours is 
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sought in rational capacities. The degree 
of social engineering then coincides with 
the stubborn view that people select the
option that they expect will beneﬁt them 
most. A characteristic feature of an 
assemblage, however, is that everything, 
in principle, has the same potential 
for meaning. Every connection creates 
something new. Therefore we should
free ourselves of the idea that everyday 
forms of expression such as emotions, 
sensations, gossip and frustration play
no signifying role, behaviours that in the 
philosophy of social engineering are still 
dismissed as irrational and unimportant. 
An assemblage is a matter of an inﬁnite 
potential of relationships that continu-
ally bring about different connections 
between things and people. This lends
unity to social reality. Not that of an 
eternal and static substance, but that
of an unlimited surface upon which a 
unique play of interactions unfolds, 
without these being able to be traced
back to ﬁxed characteristics or rational 
processes.
In short, what matters is that we con-
centrate on an explanation of social 
reality in which stagnation is replaced
by movement, in which prominence
is given to assemblages over chaos or 
disorder, in which the public is given 
a place alongside the individual and 
the population, and in which everyday 
actions and speech in an open space are 
included. Not just as a prescriptive theo-
retical model or an anarchic endeavour, 
but as a practical method to better 
understand the relationship between 
governance and social reality.
